ability of international courts to engage in a cooperative trans-institutional dialogue. 10 Indeed, Judge Greenwood in his Declaration, after noting the Court's use of jurisprudence from other courts and tribunals, declared:
International law is not a series of fragmented specialist and self-contained bodies of law, each of which functions in isolation from the others; it is a single, unified system of law and each international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals, even though it is not bound necessarily to come to the same conclusions.
11
In the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case, the question of what maritime features were capable of being sovereign territory was decided on the basis of customary international law.
12
The further question of which State was sovereign over those features also turned on application of customary international law to the acquisition of territory, including the principle of uti possidetis juris 13 and the concept of effectivités through acts à titre de souverain. 14 Although
Colombia and Nicaragua's 1928 Treaty (the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty) was a starting point for considering which State was sovereign, the Court ultimately concluded that the treaty did not conclusively answer that question because it did not clearly indicate which maritime features fell within the San Andrés Archipelago, thus necessitating reliance on other law. 15 Judge Abraham took the Court to task in his separate opinion for abandoning the treaty, arguing that 'difficulty' in interpreting a treaty is not a basis for setting it aside, 16 but his concern apparently gained no traction with the Court. As for delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States, Colombia was not a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, so the Court applied that other State. Had Mr. Diallo, through his own lawyers, appeared before the Court, it is possible that different tactical choices would have been made: they might have submitted more than just a single pleading on damages; they might have produced more evidence on the material and non-material damages, including expert opinions; and they might have implored the Court to appoint a fact-finding expert of its own, as was done in the Corfu Channel case. 
VI. Conclusion
The decisions issued by the International Court during 2012 were certainly important for those appearing before the Court; particular issues were decided that affected specific States and persons in concrete ways. Yet, as is always the case, the Court's jurisprudence has broader implications, and will not doubt affect the future disposition of disputes that arise in comparable circumstances. 105 Moreover, one can discern within this jurisprudence certain broad, crosscutting themes; ones that animated the Court's jurisprudence but might be fairly said to animate 
